We consider the problems of allocating several heterogeneous objects owned by governments to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has nonquasi-linear preferences. Nonquasi-linear preferences describe environments in which large-scale payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The "minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule" is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule that satisfies the desirable properties of strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on the domain that includes nonquasi-linear preferences. This result does not only recommend the MPW rule based on those desirable properties, but also suggest that governments cannot improve upon the MPW rule once they consider them essential. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result explains the pervasive use of the SA auction.
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isfies strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment in environments where large-scale payments influence agents' abilities to utilize the objects or enjoy their benefits (Theorem 5.1) . This result does not only recommend the MPW rule based on the four desirable properties, but also implies that no other rules are available options once governments consider the four properties as essential. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the SA auction, the result also supports SA auctions adopted by many governments. Novelties and technical difficulties. Holmström (1979) establishes a fundamental result relating to our question that applies when agents' benefits from auctioned objects are not influenced by their payments, i.e., agents have "quasi-linear" preferences. He assumes that the domain includes only quasi-linear preference, and shows that only the VickreyClarke-Groves type (VCG) 6 allocation rules satisfy strategy-proofness and Preferences are approximately quasi-linear if payments are sufficiently low. However, quasilinearity is not an appropriate assumption for large-scale auctions. Excessive payment for the auctioned objects may damage bidders' budgets and render effective use of the objects impossible. In fact, in spectrum license auctions and vehicle ownership license auctions, license prices often equal or exceed bidders' annual revenues. Thus, bidders' preferences are nonquasi-linear for such important auctions. 8 As contrasted with Holmström (1979) , our result can be applied even to such environments. Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) investigate a problem similar to ours in the case where the domain includes nonquasi-linear preferences but objects are homogeneous. They generalize VCG-type rules by employing compensating valuations, and characterize the generalized VCG-type rules by the four desirable properties. 9 We stress that when preferences are not quasi-linear, the heterogeneity of objects makes the MPW rule substantially different from the generalized VCG rule. In Section 2, we illustrate the MPW rule for simple cases, and contrast it with the VCG-type rule.
Although the assumption of quasi-linearity neglects the serious effects of large-scale auction payments of auctions in actual practice, it is difficult to investigate the above question without this assumption. Quasi-linearity simplifies the description of Pareto-efficient allocations. More precisely, under quasi-linear preferences, a Pareto-efficient allocation of objects can be achieved simply by maximizing the sum of realized benefits from objects (agents' net benefits), and hence, efficient allocations of objects are independent of how much agents pay. In this sense, Holmström (1979) characterizes only the payment part of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient rules. On the other hand, without quasi-linearity, Pareto-efficient allocations of objects do depend on payments, and thus are complicated to identify. Moreover, we illustrate this point in Section 2 in more detail. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, on nonquasi-linear domains, the MPW rule is rather different from the VCG rule, and the former outperforms the latter in terms of our desirable properties. Therefore, the extension of Holmström's (1979) result to nonquasi-linear domains is far from trivial. Needless to say, Holmström's (1979) proof techniques fail when the domain includes nonquasi-linear prefer-receives object A and pays CV 3 (A; 0), i.e., the price p A of object A is CV 3 (A; 0). This agent 1's consumption point is depicted as z 1 in Figure 3 . Agent 2 receives object B and pays CV 1 (B; z 1 ), i.e., the price p B of object B is CV 1 (B; z 1 ). This agent 2's consumption point is depicted as z 2 in Figure 3 .
Let's see why this is the outcome of the MPW rule. First, note that for each agent i = 1, 2, 3, z i is maximal for R i in the budget set {0, ( and p B = CV 1 (B; z 1 ), agent 3 exits, and agents 1 and 2 demand objects A and B, respectively. Then, the auction stops.
It is worthwhile to demonstrate that agent 2's compensating valuation of object A from the origin is highest; however, he does not receive A, and that the price of object B is not any agent's compensating valuation of object B from the origin. Accordingly, the MPW outcome does not coincide with the VCG rule from 0. Additionally, we demonstrate that efficient allocations of objects cannot be obtained simply by maximizing the sum of agents' compensating valuations from the origin in this case.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Case V: Nonquasi-linear domain (two-object case, 3). Finally, we consider the case where agents' preferences are depicted in Figure 4 . The compensating valuations from the origin are ranked as CV 1 (A; 0) > CV 3 (A; 0) > CV 2 (A; 0) and CV 1 (B; 0) > CV 2 (B; 0) > CV 3 (B; 0). In this case, the outcome of the MPW rule is as follows: Agent 1 receives object A and pays CV 3 (A; 0), i.e., the price p A of object A is CV 3 (A; 0). This agent 1's consumption point is depicted as z 1 in Figure 4 . Agent 2 receives object B and pays CV 1 (B; z 1 ), i.e., the price p B of object B is CV 1 (B; z 1 ). This agent 2's consumption point is depicted as z 2 in Figure 4 . In this case, it is agent 1's preference that decided whether agent 2 or 3 receives an object. In Figure 4 , agent 1 prefers (A, CV 3 (A; 0)) to (B, CV 2 (B; 0)), and agent 2 receives an object. However, if agent 1 prefers (B, CV 2 (B; 0)) to (A, CV 3 (A; 0)), agent 3 instead receives an object.
Similar to above Case IV, it is easy to see why this allocation is the outcome of the MPW rule, and coincides with the outcome of the SA auction. As in Case IV, the price of object B is not any agent's compensating valuation of object B from the origin, the MPW outcome does not coincide with the VCG rule from 0, and efficient allocation of objects cannot be obtained simply by maximizing the sum of agents' compensating valuations from the origin.
[ Figure 4 about here]
In the above five cases, we contrasted the MPW rule with the VCG rule. Outcomes of the two rules coincide in Cases I, II and III, but not in Cases IV and V. The VCG rule above employs only a small part of the information about agents' preferences (i.e., "compensating valuations from the origin"). On the other hand, the MPW rule employs other information (i.e., "compensating valuations from various points"). As we show in the remainder of this article, only the MPW rule satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on the domain including nonquasi-linear preferences. Thus, the information about compensating valuations from various points is necessary to design rules satisfying the above four properties on this domain.
As Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) , etc., discuss and we show formally in Section 6, the outcome of the SA auction always coincides with the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
The Model and Definitions
There are n agents and m objects, where 2 ≤ n < ∞ and 1 ≤ m < ∞. We denote the set of agents by N ≡ {1, . . . , n}, and the set of objects by
Each agent is permitted to receive one object at most. We denote the object that agent i ∈ N receives by x i ∈ L. Object 0 is referred as the "null object", and x i = 0 means that agent i receives no object. We denote the money that agent i pays by t i ∈ R. For each i ∈ N , agent i's consumption set is L × R, and agent i's (consumption) bundle is a pair
Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference relation R i on L × R. Let P i and I i be the strict and indifference relation associated with R i , respectively. Given a preference R i and a bundle z i ∈ L×R, we denote the upper contour set and lower contour set of R i at z i by the sets U C(
respectively. We assume that a preference satisfies the following properties:
Finiteness: For each
Let R E be the class of continuous, money monotonic, and finite preferences, which we call the "extended domain". Given R i ∈ R E , z i ∈ L×R, and y i ∈ L, we define compensating valuation CV i (y i ; z i ) of y i from z i for R i by (y i , CV i (y i ; z i )) I i z i . Note that by continuity and finiteness of preferences, CV i (y i ; z i ) exists, and by money monotonicity, CV i (y i ; z i ) is unique. The compensating valuation forR i is denoted by CV i .
We introduce another property of preferences.
Desirability of objects:
For each x i ∈ M and each t i ∈ R, (x i , t i ) P i (0, t i ).
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Definition 3.1. A preference R i is classical if it satisfies continuity, money monotonicity, finiteness, and desirability of objects. 
We denote the class of quasi-linear preferences by R Q , which we call the "quasi-linear domain".
An object allocation is an n-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ L n such that for each i, j ∈ N , if x i = 0 and i = j, then x i = x j , that is, any two agents do not receive the same object. Let X be the set of object allocations. A (feasible) allocation is an n-tuple z ≡ (z 1 , . . . , z n ) of bundles such that (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X. Let Z be the set of feasible allocations. We denote the object allocation and agents' payments under an allocationẑ byx ≡ (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) and t ≡ (t 1 , . . . ,t n ), respectively.
Let R be a class of preferences such that R ⊆ R E . A preference profile is an n-tuple
An allocation rule, or simply a rule, on R n is a function f from R n to Z. Given a rule f and a preference profile R ∈ R n , we denote agent i's assignment of objects under f at R by f x i (R) and i's payment under f at R by f t i (R), and we write
We introduce basic properties of rules. The efficiency condition defined below takes the auctioneer's preference into account and assumes that he is indifferent to the auctioned objects, that is, he is only interested in his revenue. An allocation z ∈ Z is Pareto-efficient for R ∈ R n if there is no feasible allocationẑ ∈ Z such that
For each R ∈ R n , let P (R) be the set of Pareto-efficient allocations for R.
Individual rationality defined below requires that a rule should never assign an allocation which makes some agent worse off than he would be if he had received no object and paid nothing. Nonnegative payment requires that the payment of agents always should be nonnegative.
Individual rationality: For each R ∈ R n and each i ∈ N , f i (R) R i 0.
Nonnegative payment: For each R ∈ R n and each i ∈ N , f t i (R) ≥ 0. The two properties below are of incentive-compatibility. The first says that by misrepresenting his preferences, no agent should obtain an assignment that he prefers.
Strategy-proofness: For each R ∈ R
n , each i ∈ N , and eachR i ∈ R,
The second is a stronger property: by misrepresenting their preferences, no group of agents should obtain assignments that they prefer.
Group strategy-proofness: For each R ∈ R n and eachN ⊆ N , there is noRN ∈ R
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Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium
We define "Walrasian equilibrium" and "minimum price Walrasian equilibrium" in this model. As Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) , etc., explain, and we show in Section 6, the minimum price Walrasian equilibria coincide with the outcomes of SA auctions. Let R ⊆ R E in this section. All results in this section also hold on the classical domain
Next is the definition of "Walrasian equilibrium".
+ of feasible allocation and price vector is a Walrasian equilibrium for R if it satisfies the following two conditions:
Condition (WE-i) says that each agent receives the object he demands, and pays its price. Condition (WE-ii) says that an object's price is zero if it is not assigned. Fact 4.1 is already proven in the literature. For example, see Alkan and Gale (1990) . Our model is a special case of their model. In Section 6, we give an alternative proof of the existence of Walrasian equilibrium as Proposition 6.1 by using the SA auction.
Given R ∈ R n , let W (R) be the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations for R, that is, z ∈ W (R) if and only if there is a price vector p ∈ R m + such that the pair (z, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for R. Fact 4.2 below is so-called First Welfare Theorem.
Fact 4.2. Let R ∈ R
n and z ∈ W (R). Then, z is Pareto-efficient for R.
14 Fact 4.3 below says that for each preference profile, there is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium.
13 Let #A denote the cardinality of set A. 14 To see this, suppose that z 
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Given R ∈ R n , let W min (R) be the set of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocations for R. That is, z ∈ W min (R) if and only if there is p min ∈ R m + such that the pair (z, p min ) is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for R. By Facts 4.1 and 4.3, for each R ∈ R n , the set W min (R) is nonempty. Although the correspondence W min is set valued, but it is essentially single-valued. That is, for each R ∈ R n , each pair z, z ∈ W min (R), and each i ∈ N , z i I i z i . 16 We denote the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R by p min (R). Next, we introduce the concepts of "overdemanded set" and "underdemanded set" (Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1986; Mishra and Talman, 2010) . We relate these concepts to Walrasian equilibria.
Fact 4.4 below is shown by Mishra and Talman (2010) under the assumption that preferences are quasi-linear. However, their proof does not depend on this assumption. Theorem 4.1 below is a characterization of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium by means of the concepts of overdemanded and weakly underdemanded sets. Mishra and Talman (2010) first obtain the same conclusion on the quasi-linear domain. We emphasize, in contrast to Fact 4.4, that Mishra and Talman's (2010) proof crucially depends on the quasi-linearity. It relies on a simple fact that when preferences are quasi-linear, if a set M of objects is weakly underdemanded at a Walrasian equilibrium (z, p) , then all the prices of M can be slightly lowered by the same amount while maintaining the Walrasian equilibrium conditions (WE-i) and (WE-ii). However, it is not true when preferences are not quasi-linear. Theorem 4.1 below is a novel result in that point.
Theorem 4.1 is the key to obtaining all the important results introduced in the subsequent sections, such as Theorem 5.1 in Section 5 and Proposition 6.1 in Section 6. As mentioned earlier, we obtain the existence of Walrasian equilibrium as a byproduct of Proposition 6.1. Thus, this theorem is also a key to the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. Let R ∈ R n . A price vector p is a minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R if and only if no set of objects is overdemanded and no set of objects is weakly underdemanded at p for R. 15 They also show that for each preference profile, there is a maximum price Walrasian equilibrium. 16 An allocation z ∈ Z is obtained by an indifferent permutation from z ∈ Z if there is a permutation π on N such that for all i ∈ N , z i = z π(i) and z i I i z i (Tadenuma and Thomson, 1991) . Note that for each pair z, z ∈ W min (R), z is obtained by an indifferent permutation from z.
The following structures of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium are obtained as a corollary of Theorem 4.1. Corollary 4.1 says that if the number of objects is greater than or equal to the number of agents, the price of some objects is 0. Corollary 4.2 says that each object bearing a positive price is connected by agents' demands to the null object or to an object with a price of 0. 17 Let R ∈ R n and (z, p) be a minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R.
Proofs of Theorem 4.1 and Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 appear in the Appendix.
Main Results
In this section, we provide a characterization of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium by means of the properties of rules.
Let R ⊆ R E . Let g be a rule such that for each R ∈ R n , g(R) ∈ W min (R). Then, g is called a selection from the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium, which we call a minimum price Walrasian rule.
Properties of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule
We discuss the properties of the minimum price Walrasian rule. Let g be a minimum price Walrasian rule on R n . First, by Fact 4.2, for each
Therefore, the minimum price Walrasian rules satisfy efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment.
Fact 5.1 below was first shown by Demange and Gale (1985) . By using Theorem 4.1 in Section 4, we show this fact more directly in the Appendix. 
Characterizations
In this subsection, we focus on the analysis in the case where each agent has a classical preference and the number of agents exceeds the number objects. Remember that all results established in Section 4 also hold in this case. Theorem 5.1 below is a main conclusion of this article, a characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule. 
Since the minimum price Walrasian rules are group strategy-proof, we obtain the following as a corollary of Theorem 5.1. Proof of Theorem 5.1 is in the Appendix. In addition, we give an overview of the proof in Section 7.
Independence of the Axioms
The only if part of Theorem 5.1 fails if we drop any of the four axioms. The following examples establish the independence of the axioms in Theorem 5.1.
Example 1 (Dropping strategy-proofness). Let f be a rule that chooses a "maximum" price Walrasian equilibrium allocation for each preference profile. Then, the rule f satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment, but not strategy-proofness.
Example 2 (Dropping efficiency ). Let f be the rule such that for each preference profile, each agent receives no object and pays nothing. Then, the rule f satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment, but not efficiency.
Next, we introduce variants of Walrasian equilibrium, one with "entry fee". Let R ∈ R n and t 0 ∈ R. A pair (z, p) ∈ Z × R m+1 of feasible allocation and price vector is a Walrasian equilibrium with "entry fee
Note that, by Facts 4.1 and 4.3, for each preference profile and each entry fee t 0 , there is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium with entry fee t 0 . Moreover, we remark that, by Fact 5.1, for each entry fee t 0 , any selection from the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium with entry fee t 0 is (group) strategy-proof.
Example 3 (Dropping individual rationality ). Let t 0 > 0. Let f be a rule that chooses a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium with positive entry fee t 0 for each preference profile. Then, the rule f satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and nonnegative payment, but not individual rationality.
Example 4 (Dropping nonnegative payment). Let t 0 < 0. Let f be a rule that chooses a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium with negative entry fee t 0 for each preference profile. Then, the rule f satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality, but not nonnegative payment.
Simultaneous Ascending Auction
In this section, we define a class of simultaneous ascending auctions, and show that they achieve the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium. Let R ⊆ R E .
Definition 6.1. Given R ∈ R n and p ∈ R m + , a set M ⊆ M of objects is a minimal overdemanded set at p for R if M is overdemanded at p for R, and there is no M M such that M is overdemanded at p.
Under a (continuous time) "simultaneous ascending auction", in each time, each bidder submits his demand at a current price vector, and the prices of the objects in a minimal overdemanded set are raised at a speed at least d > 0.
Definition 6.2. A simultaneous ascending (SA) auction is a functionp from R
n , and each x ∈ M , (ii-a) dp
is in a minimal overdemanded set at p for R, and (ii-b) dp x (t, p, R)/dt = 0 otherwise.
Remark 6.1. For each R ∈ R n , an SA auctionp generates a price path p(·) such that for each x ∈ M and each t ∈ R + ,
Proposition 6.1. For each preference profile, the price path generated by any simultaneous ascending auction converges to the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price in a finite time.
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 6.1 says that for each R ∈ R n , the price path p(·) generated by an SA auction has a final time T such that for each t ≥ T , p(t) = p(T ) = p min (R), and at the final price p(T ), each agent receives an object from his demand. Moreover, this proposition shows the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.
Overview of the proof of Theorem 5.1
We give an overview of the proof of Theorem 5.1. Since if part of the theorem follows from the discussion in Subsection 5.1, we explain the proof of only if part of the theorem.
As we emphasized in Introduction, without quasi-linearity of preferences, efficient allocations of objects depend on payments. Thus, it is difficult to identify the object allocations of the rules satisfying our desirable properties without knowing their payments. On the other hand, it is also difficult to identify the payments of the rules satisfying our properties without knowing their object allocations. In this section, we discuss how we overcome those dual difficulties.
Let R ≡ R C and n > m. The proof consists of the following four parts.
PART 1. We show the four preliminary results below, which are repeatedly used in the proof.
Lemma 5.1 below says that under individual rationality and nonnegative payment, whenever an agent does not receive any object, then the payment of the agent should be zero.
Lemma 5.1. Let f be a rule that satisfies individual rationality and nonnegative payment on R n . Let R ∈ R n and i ∈ N be such that f 
, that is, for each object except for x i , the compensating valuation ofR i from z i is negative. We refer to the preferences in R N CV (z i ) as "z i -favoring".
Lemma 5.4 says that under strategy-proofness and nonnegative payment, given a preference profile R, for each agent who is assigned an object, if the agent's preference is changed to a preference that is f i (R)-favoring, then his assignment remains the same.
Lemma 5.4. Let f be a rule that satisfies strategy-proofness and nonnegative payment on
PART 2. We establish Proposition 5.1 below, which says that for each preference profile, the allocation chosen by the rule f satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on R n should (weakly) dominate the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocations. This proposition implies that under the rule satisfying our properties, the payment of each agent is at most the minimum Walrasian price. Thus, Proposition 5.1 derives stringent upper bounds of outcome payments of the rules even without knowing their object allocations. It is a crucial step to overcome the dual difficulties in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proposition 5.1.
18 Let f be a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on
To prove Proposition 5.1, we introduce some additional notations and three lemmas.
is the agent with the lowest compensating valuation of object x from z, π x n−1 (R) is the agent with the second lowest compensating valuation of object x from z, and so on.
. Hereafter, we maintain the assumption that f is a rule on R n , and that the rule f satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment.
The next lemma says that if an agent receives object x, then his payment is not less than the (m + 1)-th highest CV of object x from the origin. Thus, the (m + 1)-th highest CV of each object from the origin is a lower bound for the payment of the agent who obtains the object.
Lemma 5.5. Let R ∈ R n , i ∈ N , and x ∈ M be such that f
By using Lemma 5.5, we obtain Lemma 5.6 below, which says that if an agent receives object x, then his CV for object x from the origin is not less than the m-th highest CV of object x from the origin. Lemma 5.6 says that an agent cannot be assigned an object x by the rule unless CV i (x; 0) ≥ C m (R, x). For each object, this lemma restricts the candidates of agents who obtain the object without knowing payments.
Lemma 5.6 implies that if for any object other than x, an agent's CV from the origin is less than the m-th highest, then he never receives an object other than x. Whether or not an agent receives object x depends on his CV of object x from the origin. It is straightforward from efficiency that if an agent has the highest CV of object x from the origin, he receives object x. Lemma 5.7 below gives a weaker sufficient condition that agent i receives object x.
Given R ∈ R N , let Z IR (R) be the set of individually rational allocations, that is, Let i ∈ N \ {3}. Without loss of generality, let i = 1. By contradiction, suppose that z 1 P 1 f 1 (R). Then, since t 1 < CV 1 (A; f 1 (R)), there is a preferenceR 1 that satisfies (1-a):
Step 1
. By (1-b) and z ∈ W min (R),
, which contradicts strategy-proofness.
Step 2 20 : We derive a contradiction to conclude that f 1 (R) R 1 z 1 . It follows from Step 1 that t 2 < CV 2 (B; f 2 (R 1 , R 2,3 )), and so, there is a preferenceR 2 that satisfies (2-a): CV 2 (A; 0) < C 3 (R 1 , R 2,3 , A) and (2-b): t 2 < CV 2 (B; 0) < CV 2 (B; f 2 (R 1 , R 2,3 )). For each i = 1, 2, 3, let z i ≡ 0. Then, by individual rationality, (2-a), and (2-b), the assumptions of Lemma 5.7 hold for the profile (R 1,2 , R 3 ). Then, by Lemma 5.7, f x 2 (R 1,2 , R 3 ) = B, and thus, by individual R 2,3 ), which contradicts strategy-proofness.
[ Figure 5 about here]
When there are more than two objects, by applying the similar argument, in Step 2, we show that there is i = 1, 2 such that z i P i f i (R 1,2 , R −1,2 ) . Repeating this argument m times inductively, we can also obtain a similar contradiction as in Step 2.
PART 3. To prove Theorem 5.1, we introduce more four lemmas. The important steps of PART 3 are to prove Lemma 5.9 and Lemma 5.11 below.
Let f be a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on R n . Given a Walrasian equilibrium allocation z, let R I (z) be the set of preferences R i ∈ R such that for each i, j ∈ N , z i I i z j , that is, all the assignments under z are indifferent. We refer to the preferences in R I (z) as "z-indifferent". 
n , let N (R, p) denote the set of demanders of the non-null objects at the price p, that is,
As discussed in Section 4, an important structure of the minimum price Walrasian equilibria is demand connectedness (Corollary 4.2). Lemma 5.9 below implies that the rule f possesses a similar structure, although in a limited pattern. It is an important step to derive the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocations from the desirable properties. Lemma 5.9 says that given a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium (z * , p) and a preference profile such that a group N of agents have z * -indifferent preferences, if (9-i) the payments of the agents outside N are not less than the price p, and (9-ii) each agent in N receives an object, then (9-a) each agent demanding only the null object at the price p receives the null object, and (9-b) an object obtained by a z * -indifferent agent is connected to the null object by the demands of non z * -indifferent agents.
Lemma 5.9. Let R ∈ R n , z * ∈ W min (R), and p be the price vector associated with z and (9-ii) and (9-b) there is a sequence
See Figure 6 for an illustration of (9-b).
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[ Figure 6 about here]
In the proof of Lemma 5.9, we intensively use Theorem 4.1, which is a characterization result of the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium by the concepts of overdemanded and weakly underdemanded sets introduced in Section 4.
We give an informal sketch of the proof of Lemma 5.9. Although we sketch the proof only for two objects case, it can be easily generalized to any finite objects case. In the Appendix, we give a formal proof of Lemma 5.9 by using induction.
Sketch of proof of Lemma 5.9 for two objects case. First, we show (9-a). Suppose that for some j /
Since agent j demands only the null object at the price p, individual rationality implies f
x . This contradicts (9-i).
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We turn to the proof of (9-b). Since n > m, at least one agent receives the null object. By Lemma 5.8-(a), z * is also a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium forR. Then, by Theorem 4.1, no weakly underdemanded set exists at p forR. Thus, at least one agent who obtains the null object demands the non-null objects at p underR. By (9-ii), no z * -indifferent agent receives the null object. Thus,
Assume that some agents in N receive the object in D 1 , i.e., for some
, and (iii) of (9-b). By f x i 1 (R) = 0 and Lemma 5.8-(c), (iv) of (9-b) also holds. Thus, (9-b) holds in this case.
Next, we assume that (9-b-1): no agent in N receives the object in D 1 , i.e., for each
By (9-b-1) and (9-a), for each x ∈ D 1 , i(x) ∈ N \ N 1 . Thus, N 2 = ∅. Since no two agents receive the same object, #D 1 = #N 2 . Then, we can show that (9-b-2): there is j ∈ N 2 who demands the object in
Note that, in two objects case, some agents in N receive the object in D 2 , i.e., for some
Note that the proof of (9-a) does not depend on the assumption that m = 2. 22 To see this, suppose that for each Thus, the set M \ D 1 is weakly underdemanded at p forR. However, by Lemma 5.8-(a) and Theorem 4.1, there is no weakly underdemanded set at p forR. This is a contradiction.
23 To see this, suppose that for each (R i 1 , p) . We show that {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } satisfies conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) in (9-b) (see Figure 7) .
Note that, by f x i 1 (R) = 0 and Lemma 5.8-(c), {f
y . This contradicts (9-i). Thus, (9-b) also holds in this case.
[ Figure 7 about here] When there are more than two objects, we next consider the case where no agents in N receives the object in D 2 . Applying a similar argument repeatedly, we can also show (9-b) in Lemma 5.9 for more general cases.
Lemma 5.10 below says that when an agent i receives object x and his CV of the null object from his assignment is negative, for each agent j = i, if j's CV of object x from the origin is greater than the difference between i's payment and i's CV of the null object from his assignment, then agent j receives an object.
Lemma 5.10. Let R ∈ R n , i ∈ N , and x ∈ M be such that f (11-i) 
In the proof of Lemma 5.11, we derive a contradiction by showing that whenever the payment of a z * -indifferent agent is less than the price p, there is another allocation that Pareto-dominates the allocation chosen by the rule. To guarantee the existence of such Pareto-improvements, we apply Lemma 5.9.
Let us explain how Lemma 5.9 works in the proof. LetR ≡ (R N , R −N ) be a preference profile such that the agents in N have z * -indifferent preferencesR N . Suppose that the payment of a z * -indifferent agent i who obtains object x is less than the price p x of object x. LetR i be an "f i (R)-favoring" and "z * -indifferent" preference such that the difference between i's payment and i's compensating valuation of the null object from i's assignment is less than the price p x , i.e., (11-ii) f
SinceR i is z * -indifferent, the preferencesR N of the group N are also in R I (z * ) #N . Then, (9-i) in Lemma 5.9 follows from (11-i). Note that for each j ∈ N \ {i}, CV j (x; 0) = p x . Thus, by (11-ii) and Lemma 5.10, for each j ∈ N \ {i}, f Then, by lemma 5.9, there is a sequence {i k } K k=1 of distinct agents satisfying conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) in (9-b). By (11-i) and Proposition 5.1, for each k < K, f
For simplicity, we focus on the case where (a) K = 4, (b) i = i K , and (c) for each k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, agent i k 's assignment under f atR is depicted in Figure 8 .
[ Figure 8 about here] Let z be the allocation such that for each k ∈ {1, 2}, agent i k obtains i k+1 's assignment under f atR, i 3 and i 4 receive z i 3 and z i 4 depicted in Figure 8 respectively, and the other agents receive their own assignments under f atR. Then, since f
2 , agent i 3 prefers z i 3 to his own assignment f i 3 (R), but all the other agents are indifferent between the two assignments. Thus, z is a Pareto-improvement for the allocation under f atR. Applying a similar argument, we can also show the existence of such Paretoimprovements for more general cases.
PART 4. We complete the proof of Theorem 5.1, that is, we show that if a rule f satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on R n , then, for each preference profile, the allocation chosen by the rule f is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
Sketch of proof of Theorem 5.1. We present an informal sketch of the proof of Theorem 5.1. Let R be a preference profile, and let (z * , p) be a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium associated with R.
LetR be a profile of z * -indifferent preferences. Then, for each object, the (m + 1)-th highest CV from the origin is equal to the price p. Thus, by Lemma 5.5, for each object x, the payment of an agent who obtains object x is not less than the price p x . We replace the preferences inR by the original preferences in R one by one, and inductively show that for each object x, the payment of an agent who obtains x is not less than the price p x .
Step 1: We replace the preferenceR i inR of an agent i by his original preference R i . Then, if agent i obtains an object x at the new profile (
, contradicting strategy-proofness. Then, Lemma 5.11 implies that the payments of the remaining agents are also not less than the price p.
Step 2: We replace the preferenceR j in (R i ,R −i ) of an agent j = i by his original preferences R j . Then, if agent i obtains an object x at the new profile (R i,j 
, contradicting strategy-proofness. Similarly, if agent j obtains an object x at the new profile
x . Then, Lemma 5.11 implies that the payments of the remaining agents are also not less than the price p.
. . .
Repeating this argument inductively, we conclude that, under the original preference profile R, the payment of each agent is not less than the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price p. Together with Proposition 5.1, this implies that each agent receives an assignment of objects in his demand set at the price p and pays its price. Thus, (WE-i) in Definition 4.1 holds. Since R ≡ R C and n > m, the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price of each object is positive. Lemma 5.2 implies that each object is assigned to someone under the rule f . Thus, (WE-ii) in Definition 4.1 also holds. Since p is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R, we conclude that f (R) ∈ W min (R).
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we considered the problem of allocating several heterogeneous objects among a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent is permitted to receive one object at most and has "nonquasi-linear" preferences. First, we extended the results of Mishra and Talman (2010) 
1).
Since the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocations can be achieved by conducting the simultaneous ascending auctions (Proposition 6.1; Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1986; etc.) , our results provide an answer to the question: "what types of auction rules are desirable for large scale auctions?", that is, the simultaneous ascending auctions should be employed when agents' preferences are not necessary quasi-linear.
Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 4 (Theorem 4.1, and Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2)
Let R ⊆ R E . To prove Theorem 4.1, we introduce the concept of "truncation"of a preference, and show a remark, two lemmas, and a fact below.
Given R i ∈ R and d i ∈ R, the d i -truncation of R i is the preferenceR i such that for Proof of Lemma 4.1. Since (z, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for R, (z, p) satisfies (WE-i) and (WE-ii) for R. Since (WE-ii) is independent of preferences, we show only (WE-i) forR, that is, that for each i ∈ N and each y ∈ L, (x i , p 
, and q y < p y .
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Proof of (i). Let q
where the second preference relation follows from q x < p x , and the third from
where the first preference relation follows from y ∈ D(R i , q), and the second from q x < p x . Then, (y, q y )P i 0 implies that y ∈ M . Thus, by (i) of Lemma 4.2, (y, q y ) P i (x, p x ) and q y < p y .
Fact 4.5 (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Let R ∈ R n , and letR be the d-truncation of R such that for each
We now proceed to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first show if part of Theorem 4.1. Then, we prove only if part. Proof of "IF" part. Assume that no set of objects is overdemanded and no set of objects is weakly underdemanded at p for R. Then, by Fact 4.4, p is a Walrasian equilibrium price. Suppose that there is a Walrasian equilibrium price q such that q ≤ p and q = p. Without loss of generality, assume that for each x ∈ M , q x < p x , and for each
Since M is not weakly underdemanded at p for R, there is N ⊆ N such that #N > #M and for
By #N > #M , this implies that M is overdemanded at q. Since q is a Walrasian equilibrium price, by Fact 4.4, this is a contradiction. Proof of "ONLY IF" part. Let p be the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R. Then, by Fact 4.4, no set of objects is overdemanded and no set of objects is underdemanded at p for R. We show that no set of objects is weakly underdemanded at p for R. Suppose that there is a set M of objects that is weakly underdemanded at p for R, that is, for each x ∈ M , p x > 0, and #{i ∈ N :
Without loss of generality, assume that M is minimum among the weakly underdemanded sets at p for R, that is, no proper subset of M is weakly underdemanded at p. Since p is a Walrasian equilibrium price, there is an allocation z ∈ Z such that for each i ∈ N,
Since no set of objects is underdemanded at p for R, #N = #M . Without loss of generality, let M ≡ {1, . . . , m } and N ≡ {1, . . . , m }.
Proof of Step 1. Since for each x ∈ M , p x > 0, it follows from (WE-ii) that for each
Consider the economy E with objects M , agents N ≡ N ∪ {m + 1}, and their preference profile (
Step 2. (z N , p M ) is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E .
Proof of
Step 2. Let (z N ,p) be the minimum price Walrasian equilibrium of E . Since
Step 2.1.
Proof of Step 2.1.
Step 2.2.
Proof of Step 2.2. Since no two agents in N − receive the same object, Step 2.1 implies
and M is minimum among the weakly underdemanded sets at p for R, M − is not weakly underdemanded at p for (R N ,R m +1 ). Thus, since for each Step 2.3.
Proof of Step 2.3. Suppose that there is
Step 2.1 implies that for each i ∈ N ,x i ∈ M . Since there are only m objects in M , this is a contradiction.
Step 2.4. (ẑ,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the original economy with objects M, agents N , and preference profile R.
Proof of Step 2.4. By Step 2.3, for each y
where the preference relation follows from x h ∈ D(R h , p), and if y ∈ M , then
where the first preference relation follows from the definition of q y , and the last fromp
where the first preference relation follows fromx h ∈ D(R h ,p), the second fromp ≤ p M , and the third from x h ∈ D(R h , p), and if y ∈ M , then
where the preference relation follows fromx
Since (z, p) and (z N ,p) both satisfy (WE-ii), (ẑ,p) also satisfies (WE-ii). Thus, (ẑ,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for R.
Remember that p is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R. However, since 
and {t(k)} m k=1 be such that Step 3. There is b < p 1 such that for any assignment sequence {z 0 (k), i(k)} m k=1 constructed as above, and for k with x(k) = 1, t(k) < b.
Proof of Step 3. For any assignment sequence {z
where the first preference relation follows from
, and the third from , and for k with x(k) = 1, t(k) < b.
LetR 1 be such that (i)R 1 is the d 1 -truncation of R 1 , and (ii) b < CV 1 (x 1 ; 0) < p 1 .
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Consider the economy E with objects M , agents N ≡ {1, . . . , m + 1}, and their preference profile (R 1 ,R m +1 , R N \{1} ). Let (ẑ,p) be a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E.
Step 4 
. . , m , can be constructed:
, and t(1) ≡p x(1) , and
Proof of Claim 4.1. We prove by induction. Part I. First, we show x(1) ≡x m +1 = 0. Supposex m +1 = 0. Then, since two agents (1 and m + 1) in N receive no object and #N = #M + 1, there is x ∈ M such that for each
This is a contradiction sincex m +1 = 0 and (ẑ,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium. Thus, x(1) = 0.
Note that by Step 1, x(1) = 0 implies that agent i(1) with x i(1) = x(1) uniquely exists. Thus, x(1), i(1), and t(1) are well-defined.
Second, we show that x(1) = x 1 . Suppose that x(1) = x 1 . Then, by
Step 3 and (ii) of
Step 3 and (ii) ofR 1 ,p p) . However, since (ẑ,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium of E, this is a contradiction. Thus, x(k) = x 1 .
Step 5. We derive a contradiction to conclude that no set of objects is weakly underdemanded at p for R.
Note that by (i) and (ii) ofR 1 , d 1 > 0. Since (ẑ,p) is a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for (R 1 ,R j , R N \{1} ), Step 2 and Fact 4.5 imply thatp ≤ p M . Note that
where the first preference relation follows fromx 1 ∈ D (R 1 ,p) , the second from the definition of compensating valuation, and the third from (ii) ofR 1 . By
Step 1 and 4, x 1 = 0 andx 1 = 0. Since (i) ofR 1 , by Remark 4.1, (x 1 ,px
where the second preference relation follows from x 1 ∈ D(R 1 , p). Thus,px 1 < px 1 . By (i) and (ii) ofR 1 , R 1 is the (−d 1 )-truncation ofR 1 and −d 1 ≤ 0 ≤ − CV 1 (0;ẑ 1 ). Then, Lemma 4.1 implies thatp is a Walrasian equilibrium price for (R N ,R j ). However, by
Step 2, p M is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for (R N ,R j ). Sincep ≤ p M and px 1 < px 1 , this is a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. Suppose that for each i ∈ N , p
M is weakly underdemanded at p for R. This is a contradiction to Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Let x ∈ M be such that p
x > 0. Then, by (WE-ii) in Definition 4.1, there is j 1 ∈ N such that x j 1 = x. By Theorem 4.1, the set {x} is demanded at p by at lease two agents, and so, there is j 2 ∈ N \ {j 1 } such that x ∈ D(R j 2 , p). If x j 2 = 0 or p x j 2 = 0, then by letting i 1 ≡ j 2 and i 2 ≡ j 1 , we obtain the desired conclusion. Thus, we assume that x j 2 = 0 and p x j 2 > 0. Then, the set {x j 1 , x j 2 } is demanded at p by at lease three agents, and so, there is j 3 ∈ N \ {j 1 , j 2 } such that x ∈ D(R j 3 , p). If x j 3 = 0 or p x j 3 = 0, then by letting i 1 ≡ j 3 , i 2 ≡ j 2 , and i 3 ≡ j 1 , we obtain the desired conclusion. Thus, we assume that x j 3 = 0 and p x j 3 > 0. Repeating this argument inductively, there is a sequence
. Then, the desired conclusion follows from (a), (b), and (c).
A.2 Proofs for Section 5 (Fact 5.1 and Theorem 5.1)
Proof of Fact 5.1. Let R ⊆ R E . Let g be a minimum price Walrasian rule on R n . By contradiction, suppose that there exist 
, where the last preference relation also follows from Figure A. 3 for an illustration of (i-(k + 1)), (ii-(k + 1)) and (iii-(k + 1)) for k = 1.
[ Figure A .3 about here]
The proof consists of the following two steps.
Step 2-1.
Proof of
Step 2-1. By contradiction, suppose that for
. Since the assumptions of Lemma 5.7 hold for the profile (R N (k) , R −N (k) ) as above, Lemma 5.7 implies that f
Step 2-2. We complete the proof of Claim 5.1.
Step 2-2. Without loss of generality, let k + 1 ≡ k and
). Then, (ii-(k + 1)) and (iii-(k + 1)) follow from (ii-k).
By (iv-k) and {k
Finally, we show (iv-(k + 1)): N (k + 1)
, and the assumptions of Lemma 5.7 hold for the profile (R N (k+1) , R −N (k+1) ). Lemma 5.7 implies that f 
That is, no set of objects is overdemanded nor weakly underdemanded at p forR. Thus, (a) follows from Theorem 4.1. Then, (b) also follows from Proposition 5.1.
Finally, we show (c). Let i ∈ N . By contradiction, suppose that f 
Thus, by Theorem 4.1, there is no weakly underdemanded set at p forR, and so, #N (R, p) ≥ m + 1. Therefore, #N + #N ≥ m + 1. By (9-ii), for each j ∈ N , f x j (R) = 0. Thus, at least one agent in N receives no object, that is, (9-1-b) holds.
Since
We introduce Claim 5.2 below to show (9-b) inductively. Note that Assumptions (9-(k − 1)-b) and (9-(k − 1)-d) of Claim 5.2 follow from (9-1-b) and (9-1-d) when k = 2, that (9-k-b) implies N (k) N (k − 1), and that Assumptions except for (9-(k − 1)-a*) hold recursively. Thus, for any k ≥ 2, as long as (9-(k − 1)-a*) holds, Claim 5.2 is applied and N (k) increases as k increases. Since N (k) ⊆ N , and N is finite, 26 there is k ≤ m such that (9-k-a*) does not hold. Let k be the first number that violates (9-k-a*) in this iteration.
By (9-k-b), for each k ∈ {1, . . . , k}, N k = ∅. Since (9-k-a*) does not hold, there are j k ∈ N k and j k+1 ∈ N such that f
To show that the sequence {j k } k+1 k =1 satisfies (iv) of (9-b), we prove for each k ∈ {1, . . . , k}, f
y . This contradicts (9-i) of Lemma 5.9.
Then, the sequence {j k } k+1 k =1 satisfies (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of (9-b). Thus, for the rest of the proof of (9-b), we prove Claim 5.2 below. Since f x (R) ∈ X, no two agents receive the same object i.e., for each x, y ∈ D k with x = y, i(x) = i(y). Thus, #N k = #D k−1 . Then, (9-k-c) also follows from (9-(k − 1)-c).
Finally, we show (9-k-d). By contradiction, suppose that for Figure A .4 for an illustration of proof of (9-k-d).
[ Figure A .4 about here]
26 By (9-ii) of Lemma 5.9 and feasibility of object allocation, it should be #N ≤ m. 27 Define N (0) = ∅. When k = 2, (9-(k − 1)-a) holds vacantly. Therefore, the set M \ k ≤k−1 D k is weakly underdemanded at p forR. However, by Lemma 5.8-(a), z * ∈ W min (R), and so, by Theorem 4.1, there is no weakly underdemanded set at p forR. This is a contradiction. 
